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THE PARADOX OF LARGE SCALE EMIGRATION FOR 
ECONOMIC REASONS FROM THE WESTERN BALKANS 
 
 
Abstract: Emigration from economic hardships has 
always been a phenomenon and it will be in the 
future. The search for a better life and economic 
welfare is also one of the main pushing factors.  
Among many others, emigration for security reasons 
is a necessity. This was exactly the primary cause of 
mass emigration from the Western Balkans during the 
civil wars of 1990s. As the war affected areas in this 
part of Europe were reconstructed and better living 
conditions than before emerged, mass emigrations 
towards western European countries resurged after 
the outbreak of civil war elsewhere – in Syria, by 
using the massive flow of refugees from the Middle 
East as an opportunity to migrate with them. This 
became apparent especially in Kosovo, Albania, and 
Northern Macedonia since 2014 onwards.  
Unlike the Syrian refugees fleeing for their own 
security, the overwhelming majority of emigrants 
from the Western Balkans are listed as economic 
asylum seekers. Yet, back to their home countries 
which currently are peaceful, the living conditions of 
the emigrants are relatively good and considerably 
much easier than ever before, but they still chose to 
emigrate for their uncertain economic perspective to 
the Western Europe. Much of them after emigration 
find their economic life even harder than in their home country they left, and that 
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still does not serve as a lesson to many more of their countrymen whose main 
ambition is to emigrate. Although their main public complaint is the economic 
reason, this paper finds that they mostly emigrate from social injustice, bad 
governance, and inefficient or selective rule of law, nepotism and discriminatory 
group interests, and high level of corruption behavior. After all, leaving the 
economic reasons aside, the emigrants want to live in the countries where the 
system has the rule of law that applies fairly, efficiently and treats them better. 
Many emigrants are even selling their property or diminishing their actual 
economic welfare at home just to search for a more relaxed life for themselves and 
their family members in the West.  
 
Keywords: Western Balkans, emigration, economic asylum seekers, 
living conditions.  
 
Introduction 
Human migrations have been a phenomenon since ancient times. They 
were caused by push and pull factors. In early stages of human development, 
migrations occurred in search of resources and more suitable locations to make a 
living. This depended on environmental conditions. At later stages, the decision to 
migrate from push factors arose from social, political and security reasons such as 
conflicts, wars, prosecution, invasions, forced migrations, human rights violations, 
which are still go on. Natural catastrophes such as earthquakes, droughts, and 
floods have often made large areas and civilizations either disappear or force the 
people to migrate.   
During the last century, people emigrated from the Western Balkans to 
elsewhere in large numbers, mainly from dramatic events such as conflicts, wars 
and genocide. The most notable period was during the Balkan Wars, WWII, and the 
1990s in the course of disintegration, civil wars and ethnic cleansing in former 
Yugoslavia. The last decade of the 20th century saw mass murder, deportation and 
atrocities in different parts of Yugoslavia, which were considered to be the worst 
since WWII, especially in Bosnia-Herzegovina and Kosovo. Between 130 000 to 
140 000 people lost their life. About 2.4 million people became refugees with an 
additional 2 million internally displaced.385 Much of the displaced persons could not 
return to their previous dwelling places due to material damages and insecurity. 
More than 600 000 people migrated to other European countries in the 1990s as 
asylum seekers for security and in search of better perspective. At the same time, it 
is estimated that over 1 million have left Albania, despite not being subject to 
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armed conflict like in Bosnia, Croatia, and Kosovo.386 In the neighboring North 
Macedonia, between 1990 and 2010, a total of 447,138 persons had left the country, 
representing around 22% of the country’s total population.387   
With the rebuilding of infrastructure in war affected areas of former 
Yugoslavia, Bosnia-Herzegovina and Kosovo in particular, and support for 
development by various UN and foreign governmental agencies, the refugees 
gradually begun to return in their home countries. Peace was established and 
political stability established. Seeking a better perspective, a large number of 
internally displaced people moved from rural into urban areas. However, after a 
long time of peace and economic recovery, emigration in large numbers resumed 
during 2014-15. The primary incentive came from massive waves of immigrants 
from the Middle East, namely from Syria, Iraq, and Afghanistan who were heading 
towards the Western European countries. That was the opportunity which many 
from Albania, Kosovo, and North Macedonia used to emigrate, but not for the same 
or similar reasons. The EU had also to make a distinction between the immigrants 
from the Western Balkans and the Middle East. The former migrated for security 
while the latter as economic asylum seekers. Were economic conditions really the 
cause as a push factor? 
The year 2014 marked the beginning of an era of increased use of 
smartphones, thus enabling better and easier access to various available information 
and communication across the globe. This made many people from the Balkans 
realize that the life and economic perspective is easier and better in the West. Much 
of them initially tried to emigrate through legal ways by requesting tourist and 
working permission visa, or as part to rejoin the family, especially from Kosovo 
where the visa liberalizations to the EU countries has not yet happened. With long 
queues at foreign embassies, they took the opportunity to emigrate illegally together 
with the flood of refugees from the Middle East. Many citizens from Albania and 
North Macedonia used this opportunity as well.  
 
Theories on the causes of emigrations 
In modern times, migrations in search of better life, especially after World 
War One, occurred mainly from Europe, Asia, and Africa to America and Australia. 
After 1945, Europe itself became a destination for emigrants as it was in need for 
labor force. The largest pool of workers came from Southeastern Europe and 
Turkey, which in Germany became known gastarbeiter or guest workers. In this 
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respect, migrations from economically poorer to more advanced countries was 
viewed a permanent phenomenon caused by the demand for labor in the latter as a 
pull factor.388 The emigrants upon being integrated into labor market and working 
begin to earn incomes, which they may use to satisfy their needs, or save a part of 
them for spending in their own country of origin. In many cases, this applies to 
individual as well as large number of migrants, but not to those who have migrated 
permanently, are well integrated into host country and do not maintain any presence 
in the country from which they left.  
As capitalism became global and the world economy more integrated, the 
search for space, raw materials, market, and labor became more intensive. This in 
turn followed not only labor mobility but also migration of unemployed people 
towards more developed locations. The companies on the other hand expanded their 
activities in the vicinity of regions with raw materials and labor force.389 At home, 
developed countries have mainly absorbed a part of international migration from 
their former colonies or where their investment, ideological, political and cultural 
relations were based. People are more likely to emigrate to the countries where 
there is already a sort of their native community or have relatives. However, in 
cases of deteriorated situation in their home country, they are more likely to 
emigrate selectively, and this prompts more emigration at one or certain 
circumstances.390   
The EU has become a large recipient of immigrants, and that probably is 
acting as an attractive destination. The group of immigrants, however, are diverse 
by their skills, thus lower skilled workers who often move illegally, are more likely 
to be returned either by the EU countries individually, or sometimes with a ban not 
to travel in EU area for several years. Sometimes, the return of masses is arranged 
with the country of origin through reforms and support programs. Controlled or 
arranged return is made to avoid the risk of social tensions for the rejected asylum 
seekers who have entered a foreign country irregularly. This arranged return does 
not apply often and the governments of developed countries pursue the deportation 
amid criticism and provocation of xenophobia by their own people towards the 
immigrants.391 
                                                 
388  Piore, Michael J. (1979), Birds of Passage: Migrant Labor in Industrial Societies, 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.  
389 Massey, Douglas S. (1986), "The settlement process among Mexican migrants to the 
United States", American Sociological Review 51: 670-685. 
390  Massey, Douglas S., Arango, Joaquin., Hugo, Graeme., Kouaouci, Ali., Pellegrino, 
Adela., and Taylor, J. Edward (1993), “Theories of International Migration: A Review and 
Appraisal”, Population and Development Review, Vol. 19, No. 3, pp. 431-466.  
391 Harris, Nigel (2007), “The economics and politics of the free movement of people”, in 
Migration without borders: Essays on the free movement of people, Antoine Pécoud and 
Paul de Guchteneire eds., Paris: UNESCO, pp. 33-50. 




One of the criteria of EU policies along free movement of goods is also 
the free movement of people, but only among member states and some in the 
process to join the block. That makes it “Europe without borders”, but the borders 
do apply to the rest of the world. Migration from the poorer countries of Europe are 
seen as a threat to hosting developed countries, and more from the poorer countries 
of other countries. The threat perception is based on illegal activities by the 
immigrants such as smuggling, organized crime, terrorism and illegal human 
trafficking, among others. Another worry expressed by the developed societies is 
that large immigration poses a threat in demographic development and emerging of 
clashes between different immigrant communities. These tendencies of 
uncontrolled and large scale migrations have given rise to nationalism of host 
countries which is at the forefront of opposing the migration. Stricter control of 
borders is not proved to prevent migration but rather encourage illegal immigration 
through alternative channels. Cutting off or making the immigrants ineligible to 
social benefits has also been counterproductive as it results more in the chances of 
dealing with criminal and other illegal activities, which would be a burden for the 
governments of host countries to cope with.392 
One of the most debated topic in the theory of emigration from 
developing towards developed countries, has been the so-called “brain drain” which 
expressed concerned that poor countries are getting poorer in human resources as 
their skilled workers, professionals and experts are emigrating to richer countries 
for higher pay. It came as a result of decreased work in labor-intensive sectors in 
developed economies and faster development of technology along with knowledge-
based economy. Brain drain was true until globalization and information 
technology intensified and overwhelmed the world. Under growing impact of 
globalization and technological development, professionals no longer are eager or 
desperate to search a better place abroad for working conditions. Although migrant 
professionals might have a nostalgia for the country or university abroad where 
they studied, they now find themselves in good position in their country of origin 
through international transfer of economic, research projects, technological and 
scientific contributions. They also become more reintegrated in their country of 
origin by engaging in national and transnational activities.393 For similar reasons, 
many professionals from development countries emigrate temporarily to work in 
different poor countries, which is part of a global labor mobility whenever it is 
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available or applies. Therefore, the brain drain theory has considerably been altered 
and it does not have the meaning it had some forty or fifty years ago. Instead, those 
who are still migrating in massive irregular ways from poor countries are mainly 
less educated and unskilled workers, excluding extraordinary migrations occurring 
from wars and natural disasters.  
As mentioned in introductory part of this article, the recent waves of mass 
migrations to the EU emerged from the Middle East for known causes. They had 
begun since the wars in Afghanistan (2001) and Iraq (2003) but reached a larger 
scale after the Syrian Civil War (2011). These events had produced millions of 
refugees who initially sought to move into nearer countries or safe zones, then from 
2014 onwards began migrating in massive waves towards the EU countries. As they 
passed through the Balkans, many people from Albania, North Macedonia sought 
either to join them or migrate on their own with the same requirements as refugees 
but for a different declared reason, and that was, poor economic conditions. Did 
they really emigrate for economic reasons, and why did they used the opportunity 
for irregular emigration along and at the same time with the Middle Eastern people 
to the same destination – the EU countries?    
 
Resurge of mass emigrations from the Western Balkans, 2014 
onwards 
Emigration from Southeastern Europe, Western Balkans respectively, to 
the Western and Northern European countries have a history after WWII. 
Regardless in what numbers, emigration went on gradually, except during the 1990s 
as a result of bloody disintegration of former Yugoslavia, and in Albania after the 
fall of communism and riots in 1997. They had a cause to be addressed to, and that 
was, insecurity at home and in search of better life in developed countries. That was 
considered as the primary push factor, which obviously corresponded to the events 
in their home countries. After a decade and a half of stabilization, there was no any 
major cause of mass irregular emigration or in large scale. So, why did many 
people from Albania and Kosovo leave in 2014-2015?  First, let us have a look at 
the figures of Eurostat.  
 





Figure 1: Asylum seekers in the EU member states by country of origin, 
as of 2015 
Source: Eurostat (2016), “Asylum in the EU Member States”, 44/2016 - 4 
March 2016, Luxembourg: Eurostat Press Office, p. 3.  
In absolute terms, the largest number of asylum seekers in the EU 
member states were from Syria, to be followed by Afghanistan and Iraq. Next came 
Kosovo, but given her relative small number of total population (around 1.78 
million) at the time, this made the highest share of emigrants and asylum seekers 
per capita in the world. The same can be said for asylum seekers from Albania 
whose share was slightly lower from a total population of over 2.8 million. Taken 
together, irregular emigrants from Albania and Kosovo taken together surpassed in 
absolute figures those from Iraq to the EU. The EU countries in which they 
emigrated and applied for asylum, were those already hosting Albanian 
communities such as Germany, Austria, Belgium. Most emigrants from Albania 
followed a different route in their largest part through Italy, which traditionally was 
the primary country of destination. This is line with theoretical expectation that 
people are more likely to emigrate towards countries where there is a community of 
their own ethnicity. Before we discuss what made them leave, despite their all 
declared in host countries as economic asylum seekers, let as look at the route of 
Kosovo Albanian emigrants.  
 





Figure 2: Asylum applications by nationality in Hungary 
 
Source: International Organization for Migration, available at: 
http://www.iom.hu/migration-issues-hungary, visited in December 2020.  
 
Hungary was not the final destination of emigrants but rather a transit to 
other EU countries. In any case, unable to go further, the emigrants applied for 
asylum with a hope that they would be able to move elsewhere to Western or 
Northern Europe in the near future. The striking feature is than in 2014, Kosovo 
emigrants made half of total among those who applied for asylum in Hungary. In 
figures, that meant a total of 21,453 Kosovars, far larger than Afghans (8,796) and 
Syrians (6,857). This wave of mass migration from Kosovo begun in March 2014 
and continued through 2015, disappointed by the government, inefficient rule of 
law, allegations for rampant corruption and unaccountable institutions. Although no 
empirical study or survey has been undertaken to analyze the cause of such 
irregular migration which was in large numbers since 1999, the quick and simple 
answer to the media by those who were leaving, was: “There is no perspective here 
[in Kosovo].” Despite that they were uncertain what was to await them during the 
journey or in the destination they wanted to arrive, they thought that just leaving is 
a better option. It should be noted that economic reasons which they blamed as a 
cause to make them emigrate, were inspired to them when they were witnessing 
many of their countrymen who emigrated irregularly and after some time either 
found a job or simply managed to be and live abroad. After a while, many of those 
irregular emigrants who managed to find a work abroad, return to Kosovo with 
expensive cars. This generated a feeling among local population in Kosovo that 
moving to the Western developed countries at any cost and through whatever ways, 
brings about immediate welfare as witnessed, among others, by expensive cars. The 
only thing not known or told was that the overwhelming majority of those cars were 
rent a car or bought by credit. Upon spending the holidays with expensive cars in 
Kosovo to show the public how “rich” they have quickly become, after going back 
to their host country, they had to return the car they have rented or need to work 




many years to pay the credit for it. In any case, this deception worked to encourage 
many people to leave the country on the grounds of finding a better welfare. A large 
number headed through Serbia and ended up in prison camps in Hungary. They 
thought this to be a transition to an awaited better future elsewhere in the EU 
countries.  
Despite warnings by the EU countries, media and irregular emigrants 
from prison camps, the wave of Kosovo citizens continued to leave the country 
during 2015. The second pie chart from Figure 2 shows the share of asylum seekers 
from Kosovo in Hungary to be 15% of the total or much lower than of Syrians 
(39%) and Afghanis (27%). However, this time, Kosovo asylum seekers were 
larger in number (24,454) than they were in 2014 (21,453) where they accounted 
for 50% of total asylum seekers. So they kept leaving more, as more refugees from 
the Syria and Afghanistan arrived in the same route to Hungary. This might have 
not been a coincidence, but they sought it as an opportunity which is also the main 
cause of emigration. The rest of pie charts in Figure 2 for 2016 and 2017 do not 
show any share of Kosovo citizens, but it is more important to know what happened 
to majority of them who emigrated during 2014-2015. Figure below gives an 
overall picture, which follows discussion by numbers.  
     
 
Figure 3: Returned immigrants in 2016 
 
Source: Eurostat (2017), “Almost e quarter of million non-EU citizens 
returned in 2016”,  26/07/2017, Luxembourg: Eurostat Press Office. 
The year 2016 became popular in the EU as “immigration crisis”, which 
culminated in the withdrawal of the United Kingdom from EU through a 
referendum vote on June 23. It matches the theory that host countries are concerned 




about massive influx of immigrants for a variety of reasons already mentioned in 
the previous section of this article. The Figure 3 was published a month later after 
Brexit or on July 27, with an order to irregular immigrant to leave the EU. This 
wave of immigration crisis gave more rise to Eurscepticism and the right wing 
populism of Hungarian Prime Minister, Viktor Orban, whose country became like a 
gate of massive immigrants to the EU.  
The largest number of immigrant ordered to leave the EU were the 
citizens from Albania (42,600) or almost one in five of total, then Ukraine (22,600), 
Iraq (17,100), Kosovo (13,000), Serbia (12,200) and Morocco (9,900). We have not 
considered smaller scale of emigration and return beyond 2016 as the focus was on 
unexpected emigration in massive numbers during 2014-2015 and immediate order 
to leave in 2016. Many of those who made it out of Hungary further to the West, 
had relatives or friends who came to pick them up and guarantee for their shelter. 
Many others, however, did not have this fate and were deported to their own 
country of citizenship. They also lost a part of their incomes and ended up worse 
off in their home country.    
 
Conclusions and policy implications  
The mass emigrations of 2014-2015 from Kosovo, Albania and partially 
North Macedonia were and still are not necessarily related to economic 
conditions at their home country, despite being declared abroad by the 
immigrants themselves as being so. True, when they emigrate in massive ways, 
they certainly find themselves in hopeless economic situation in any country they 
arrive. In this way, much of them end up worse off in the short-run than in the 
home country from which they emigrated. The mass return of these emigrants in 
2016 from the EU countries was a warning that economic life and perspective is 
not significantly easier abroad as they initially thought. 
Although this article maintains that economic reasons are not the 
primary cause of emigration from the Western Balkans, it should be reminded 
that the feeling of potential insecurity has not vanished. The past experience 
certainly offers a lot of lessons in this respect, especially in the last decade of the 
20th century. Much of the population has either been an eyewitness of, or is very 
familiar with, what happened. Faced with fragile democracies and ethnic hatreds 
which despite the progress made in reconciliation, and the fear of potential 
conflicts, can be considered the main but not widely accepted motive of 
emigration; they are worried more about future security rather than emigrating 
on what they publicly claim to be pure economic grounds. After all, they want a 
better environment in which the rule of law offers them more freedom and being 
happy rather than just more material gains and consumption.     
Brain drain theory, so much explored and criticized in the literature of 
emigration for impoverishing poorer countries, has significantly fallen as 
occurrence and phenomenon. Globalization plaid a role by offering local people 




the things such as technology, internet and knowledge they have had not access 
to before. However, the key to reversing the drain brain has not been only the 
mobility of experts and international education institutions, but also the 
requirements of governments and universities in the developed world that the 
students upon completion of their studies be returned to their country of origin. 
That is why the recent waves of emigration are largely made of less educated 
people. Professionals and experts emigrate on individual bases and through legal 
procedures, and that for a short period of time or employment as they are more 
integrated in the globalization by their expertise, regardless where they might be 
located or moved to.  
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